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Words change meaning, usually in unpredictable ways. But some words’ meanings are 
revised intentionally. Revisionary projects are normally put forward in the service of some 
purpose – some serve specific goals of inquiry, and others serve ethical, political or social 
aims. Revisionist projects can ameliorate meanings, but they can also pervert. In this paper, 
I want to draw attention to the dangers of meaning perversions, and argue that the self-
declared goodness of a revisionist project doesn’t suffice to avoid meaning perversions. 
The road to Hell, or to horrors on Earth, is paved with good intentions. Finally, and more 
importantly, I want to demarcate what meaning perversions are. This, I hope, can help us 
assess the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects. 




Theories about the meaning of words for social categories and roles raise several 
interconnected questions. One is metaphysical: What is the nature of the social things we 
talk about? Another is conceptual: How do we think about the social world, and how does 
our thinking relate to the nature of social reality? And how should it relate? The latter 
question concerns so-called ameliorative projects. Such projects aim to address other 
additional questions, for instance, what is the point of having the concept in question? 
What concept (if any) would better serve our social or political goals? And who are we?1 
In this paper, I argue that we should add one more question to this list, namely: 
                                                   
1 These questions are illustrated in debates about race, for instance in Appiah (2006), Glasgow (2003), 




How can we assess the legitimacy of ameliorative projects? I will try to answer this 
question by drawing from deeply problematic historical cases. Based on these cases, I’ll 
introduce two notions of meaning perversion. This, I believe, will put us in a better position 
to understand the limits of the moral and political legitimacy of ameliorative projects. 
Permissible meaning revisions are those that are not meaning perversions. This does not 
tell us which are revisionary projects we should develop. But it gives us a way of 
circumscribing the meaning revisions we should not pursue.  
Suppose we are interested in understanding crucial concepts of the language of 
justice and politics, e.g., in understanding the concepts expressed by words like 
‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, ‘fair elections’, ‘citizen’, ‘the people’, etc. Sally Haslanger has 
persuasively made the case that we can mean different things by “conceptual analysis”, and 
that our reflection on the role of the language of politics can take different approaches. 
Haslanger (2006) distinguished between manifest, operative, and target concepts. A 
manifest concept is the concept one thinks guides one’s categorizing, whereas the operative 
concept is the one that corresponds to actual categorization patterns. The target concept is 
the concept that, all things considered, we should employ given our interests, the facts, etc. 
(Haslanger, 2006, 99); it is the concept that, at the end of the ameliorative project, we 
should be using. 
The question I address in this paper – how do we assess the moral and political 
legitimacy of revisionary projects? – is thus essential to know if a project is ameliorative. 
Haslanger considers a close question, and says “whether or not an analysis is an 
improvement on existing meanings depends on the purposes of the inquiry.” (Haslanger, 
2012, fn 1, p. 367) But I take it that it would be too naïve to believe that an analysis is an 
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amelioration just in case the “engineers” of the revision have good purposes. Some features 
of what Maynard and Benesch (2016) call Dangerous Speech, which I introduce below, 
show that people can be convinced of the goodness of a purpose while bringing out very 
bad outcomes. Hence, whether a revision is an improvement does not depend exclusively 
on how convinced theorists or activists are of the presumed goodness of their ends. 
I take it, also, that there is some tension between the concept we should be using, 
all things considered and the concept we should be using, given our aims, interests, or the 
facts. The intersection of what we should do, all things considered, and what we should do, 
given our aims, leaves open the possibility that the answer to the legitimacy question may 
be epistemically unavailable, or that we can be willfully ignorant of the right answer. It 
would thus be desirable to have some constraints or guidelines to assess a revisionary 
projects’ legitimacy. 
Now, when theorists consider conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics, they are 
often concerned with the concepts a word should express, given the specific aims of the 
theory. Theoretical concerns are normally removed from the political domain. For instance, 
Tarski (1943) considered that ‘truth’ as used in natural languages is an incoherent notion, 
and that it gives rise to paradox. He argued that ‘truth’ should be defined in a way that 
would allow it to play its foundational role in a semantic theory, while insulating the theory 
from the contradictions and paradoxes that the natural language use gives rise to. For the 
purposes of the theory, a revision of the meaning of ‘true’ is desirable if the intended 
meaning fulfills the relevant theoretical aims. 
Theoretical goals can also be pursued in social and political domains. Yet, there are 
differences between the theoretical domains that do not touch on socially relevant notions, 
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and those that transpire into language use ‘in the wild’. Whereas the notion of truth in 
Tarski’s theory is not meant to replace the use of ‘truth’ in informal discourse, meaning 
revisions about social kinds or social relations often have both theoretic and social aims. 
For example, redefining what ‘marriage’ means in actual legislations has arguably changed 
the extension of ‘marriage’ in the real world.2 
This paper differs from other recent articles that try to pin down the normative 
constraints of conceptual engineering. For instance, Simion (2017) is optimistic about the 
prospects of conceptual ameliorations, but considers only epistemic constraints: a concept 
should be ameliorated, she claims, only insofar as this does not entail epistemic loss. 
Podosky (2018) argues contra Simion that epistemic loss is not an adequate criterion, and 
that conceptual revision should be allowed whenever it has the “capacity to causally 
influence the world”. Moreover, he suggests, normative questions should address 
feasibility constraints. He says that the claim that a concept should be engineered is right 
only if 
... its desired causal influence on social reality is feasible; and the claim that a concept 
should be engineered is wrong if its desired causal influence on social reality is infeasible. 
Importantly, the notion of feasibility mentioned here is epistemic: It is about the feasibility 
of representational accuracy. (Podosky 2018, 13) 
 
In other words, the conceptual engineering is feasible only if it is possible for a concept to 
come to accurately represent (social) reality. For instance, the revision of ‘marriage’ and 
the progressive change of legislation in liberal democracies around the world is feasible in 
Podosky’s sense, and this answers the question of whether ‘marriage’ should be 
ameliorated. This is an answer to one reading of the normative question. 
This is not the reading of the ‘should’ in ‘when should a concept be ameliorated?’ 
                                                   
2 I’m grateful to Pablo Rychter and Esa Díaz León for discussion about this point. 
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that I have in mind.3 I have in mind moral and political legitimacy. A conceptual 
engineering project could be feasible in Podosky’s sense, and still be morally and 
politically illegitimate. In other words, we should ask when are revisionist projects not 
ameliorative but perversive. I will argue that there is no obvious answer as to what ‘the 
value of a meaning revision’ can be beyond serving specific theoretical purposes, and that 
it is hard to balance the value of pursuing theoretical aims against the possible harms of 
using the words ‘in the wild’, so to speak. The conviction that an analysis is pursued with 
good intentions does not guarantee the goodness of the outcome. And even when 
revisionary projects achieve their aims, the aims themselves may not be desirable. On the 
contrary, people should be cautious of deep feelings that their purposes are desirable or 
good. There may be cases where there is no clear answer to the question of what people 
should do. Given this, it would be desirable to establish guidelines for assessing the moral 
legitimacy of revisionist projects. It would be useful to know, for instance, which projects 
should not be pursued. To this end, I’ll consider two alternative definitions of meaning 
perversions. 
Section 2 introduces some historical examples of meaning perversions, and points 
to cognitive and affective biases that are conducive to condoning harmful practices and 
behavior, while protecting agents’ moral self-righteous convictions. Section 3 explores the 
limits of our capacity to establish the moral and political legitimacy of revisionary projects, 
and takes race as a case study to illustrate the point. Section 4 characterizes meaning 
                                                   
3 Lawford-Smith (2013) argues that the appeal to political feasibility is often used for ruling out political 
theories that can’t be implemented, but that it should rather be used as a tool for ranking alternative theories 
“along one of the dimensions relevant to making decisions about what to actually do” (Lawford-Smith, 2013, 
245). Furthermore, feasibility is independent of both desirability and risk. Hence, although understanding 
feasibility is an essential step in assessing political projects, it does not assess the desirability of the projects’ 
ends or risks. 
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perversions. Ultimately, meaning perversions are revisionary projects that are politically or 
morally illegitimate. The section offers two different non-equivalent and non-extensional 
definitions of meaning perversion: one characterized in terms of harmful (perlocutionary) 
effects, and one characterized in constitutive terms. The possibility of meaning perversions 
in either sense establish the limits of permissible meaning revisions. 
 
2 Meaning revisions in the wild 
2.1 Lessons from the past and the present 
In LTI, The Language of the Third Reich, Victor Klemperer offers a chilling description of 
the corrupting power of language. Klemperer witnessed how, under the Third Reich, “huge 
number of concepts and feelings” were corrupted and perverted. This was the case of 
words like ‘heroic’, ‘heroism’, or ‘fanatic’. In his diaries, he registered how the use of 
these words shifted in a way that indicated that, for instance, one could not be a hero unless 
one were a fanatic. At the same time, fanaticism was no longer regarded as a negative trait. 
Klemperer reported that even after WW2 ended, 
… young people in all their innocence, and despite a sincere effort to eliminate the errors in 
their neglected education, cling to Nazi thought processes… as soon as this concept 
(heroism) was touched upon, everything became blurred in the fog of Nazism… and then 
replaced it with ‘fanatical’. (Klemperer, 2000, 14) 
 
He continues by drawing an illustrative analogy where Nazi language “commandeers for 
the party that which was previously common property and steps words, groups of words, 
and sentence structures, in poison.” 
Masha Gessen has also written on the corrupting power of discourse. In an article 
from 2017, “The Autocrat’s Language”, she warns us of the damage of Donald Trump’s 
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discourse to social and political reality. She compares the way Trump talks with the way 
autocrats in the former Soviet Union, and present day rulers in Russia, talk. She says, 
A Russian poet named Sergei Gandlevsky once said that in the late Soviet period he 
became obsessed with hardware-store nomenclature. He loved the word secateurs, for 
example. Garden shears, that is. Secateurs is a great word. It has a shape. It has weight. It 
has a function. It is not ambiguous. It is also not a hammer, a rake, or a plow. It is not even 
scissors. In a world where words were constantly used to mean their opposite, being able to 
call secateurs “secateurs”—and nothing else—was freedom. 
“Freedom,” on the other hand, was, as you know, slavery. That’s Orwell’s 1984. And it is 
also the USSR, a country that had “laws,” a “constitution,” and even “elections,” also 
known as the “free expression of citizen will.” The elections, which were mandatory, 
involved showing up at the so-called polling place, receiving a pre-filled ballot—each 
office had one name matched to it—and depositing it in the ballot box, out in the open. 
Again, this was called the “free expression of citizen will.” There was nothing free about it, 
it did not constitute expression, it had no relationship to citizenship or will because it 
granted the subject no agency. Calling this ritual either an “election” or the “free 
expression of citizen will” had a dual effect: it eviscerated the words “election,” “free,” 
“expression,” “citizen,” and “will,” and it also left the thing itself undescribed. When 
something cannot be described, it does not become a fact of shared reality. Hundreds of 
millions of Soviet citizens had an experience of the thing that could not be described, but I 
would argue that they did not share that experience, because they had no language for 
doing    so. At the same time, an experience that could be accurately described as, say, an 
“election,” or “free,” had been preemptively discredited because those words had been used 
to denote something entirely different. 
 
So, where Klemperer talks of ‘that which was previously common property’, 
Gessen talks of a lost ‘shared reality’. This is, I think, one of the harmful effects of 
meaning perversions, but here I will not elaborate further on what that amounts to, or how 
it opens the way for autocracy.  
I call these uses of “freedom”, “free expression of citizen will”, “election”, 
“heroic”, “fanatical”, meaning perversions. I will consider two non-synonymous and 
(possibly) non-coextensional senses of meaning perversion in section 4: a causal 
consequentialist sense, and a constitutive sense. The next subsection illustrates the extent 
of the consequences of our cognitive failures and biases in some extreme cases. 
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2.3 The road to Hell is paved with good intentions 
The end aim of meaning revisions is sometimes self-interested. Some politicians’ use 
words like ‘law and order’ or ‘justice’ to manipulate the justice system in order protect 
themselves or consolidate their power, not to promote the rule of law in the service of 
justice and fairness. Other politicians’ use words like ‘democracy’ and ‘free elections’ to 
perpetuate their hold on power, not to guarantee governments representative of citizens’ 
rights and of the rule of law. Yet, meaning revisions often do have genuine social or 
political justice aims, or at least, aims that their proponents believe will bring about a better 
world. This section discusses some historical cases where extremely harmful consequences 
were seen as morally and politically permissible, or even required. People’s inability to 
foresee those consequences were often due to common cognitive limitations. How does 
this relate to conceptual engineering projects? Revisionists may genuinely believe in the 
goodness of their purposes and methods. But there can be gaps between the best course of 
action for a certain end, and people’s epistemic capacity to assess those means and end. 
And the fact that certain ends are desired does not make them desirable (all things 
considered), or desirable independently of the means set to achieve them.  
In recent work, Maynard and Benesch (2016) discuss the conditions under which 
so-called Dangerous Speech can occur. They characterize Dangerous Speech as speech acts 
that are capable of encouraging approval of violence by an audience. This provides an 
extreme example of discourse that, from the perspective of the speaker and the target 
audience, is perceived as morally legitimate. As Maynard and Benesch characterize 
Dangerous Speech, it is a product of both its context and its content, which feed into and 
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overlap with each other. The specific features of the contexts of Dangerous Speech are the 
(influential) speaker, the audience in its the socio-historical environment, and the 
availability of means of dissemination (Maynard and Benesch, 2016, 77). If a community 
relies mainly on one source of information, the message spread by that source has a greater 
impact. But an influential or authoritative speaker addressing a volatile audience through 
mass means of information is not producing Dangerous Speech if the content is not 
inflammatory or hateful. Dangerous Speech often occurs in social and historical contexts 
that increase the likelihood that the audience accepts that violence against certain people is 
morally permissible. It can be seen as rightful punishment for presumed past crimes, or as 
means to prevent presumed existential threats. Socio-historical contexts of Dangerous 
Speech may include longstanding grievances, resentment, the memory of historic injustices 
(real or imagined), a weak or dysfunctional justice system, competition for resources, or 
land disputes. Influential speakers may manipulate and exacerbate the resentment against 
members of another group for political gains. 
Maynard and Benesch (2016) then offer a characterization of six possible features 
of the content of Dangerous Speech. These features need not all be present, and need not be 
present in the same way in all cases. The first is dehumanization through language,4 which 
includes forms of discourse that can do direct harm by the offense, denigration, or 
derogation of members of a target group as undeserving of the duties that are owed to them 
qua persons. The second feature of the content of dangerous speech is guilt attribution: 
members of a group are said to be guilty (as members of the group) of past crimes, e.g., 
rape or murder, stealing, responsible for current difficulties, destruction of the economy, 
                                                   
4 See also Tirell (2012) or Jeshion (2016). 
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occupation, or oppression, etc., and their guilt is offered as the moral justification for 
feelings of resentment and retributive action. The third feature content is threat 
construction: an in-group accuses an out-group of posing an existential threat, which 
contributes to morally justify acting in self-defense. The fourth feature is the destruction of 
alternatives and the representation of a course of action as a historical necessity, or of 
alternative courses of action as impractical or inefficacious. For instance, Figes (2002) 
describes how many citizens of the Soviet Union thought that the violence of the Stalinist 
era was the only possible and necessary path to Communism, reporting someone that said: 
“I had my doubts about the Five Year Plan… but I justified it by the conviction that we 
were building something great… a new society that could not have been built by voluntary 
means”. (Figes, 2002, 111)  
The fifth important feature is what Maynard and Benesch (2016) call VirtueTalk, 
through which the audience is motivated by “deep and unreflected feelings that something 
feels ‘good’ or ‘bad’, in particular feelings that induce positive moral self-appraisal”, a 
“satisfactory mental image of themselves… often shaped by notions of ideal group-
identities, that produces considerable self-esteem” (Maynard and Benesch, 2016, 84). It 
also contributes to the moral justification of actions against an out-group. The final feature 
of the content of dangerous speech is Future-bias, i.e., the biased belief in a promise of 
future goods. Future-bias is presumed to outweigh the short-term difficulties the audience 
may have to endure, or the moral costs of the violence against others: “But the anticipated 
benefits can also be extravagant and utopian—promises that a positive transformation of 
society will be brought about through a temporary violent transition, or that national unity 
and prosperity for a long-mistreated people can be obtained. In light of the expectation that 
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Soviet violence would protect the revolution and usher in Communist utopia, Lenin 
assured his followers that in the future ‘the cruelty of our lives, imposed by circumstance, 
will be understood and pardoned. Everything will be understood, everything.’” (Maynard 
and Benesch, 2016, 85-86) 
Dangerous Speech thus arises when a perfect storm of cognitive biases and 
contextual conditions come together. The great motivational strength of Dangerous Speech 
– its nearly irresistible pull – comes from its reliance on moral reasoning and motivation. 
This motivational force of Dangerous Speech arguably depends on the reactive attitudes 
involved. The notion of reactive attitudes was introduced by P. F. Strawson (2008), and it 
includes attitudes like gratitude, resentment, contempt. These are attitudes that we have in 
reaction to another person’s action towards us. They are essential both in interpersonal 
relations and in our moral lives.5 Yet, our cognitive failures and biases – in ascribing guilt 
to others, in ruling out alternative courses of action, in seeing ourselves as virtuous, as just 
knowing that we’re right, or towards some utopic future ideal, show that reactive attitudes 
and the actions they motivate can be easily misguided and morally unjustified. 
Meaning perversions are not a minor issue. It should not surprise anyone to learn 
that meaning perversions played a central role in cases of Dangerous Speech that motivated 
historically inhumane acts of mass violence. Through meaning perversions, as Victor 
Klemperer put it, “language does not simply write and think for me, it also increasingly 
dictates my feelings and governs my entire spiritual being the more unquestioningly and 
unconsciously I abandon myself to it”. Meaning perversions played a part in making it 
possible for Soviet citizens to tolerate and condone the actions that brought about the 
                                                   
5 The notion has been deployed in recent moral and political philosophy, for instance by Manne (2017), 
Björnsson and Hess (2017), Goldman (2014), or Couto (2019). 
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hunger of millions of people, for instance the Holodomor in Ukraine (a fact many still deny 
or minimize).6  
How can we circumscribe the limits of morally and politically legitimate meaning 
revisions, in particular when politics or justice are at stake? 
 
3 The limits of ameliorative projects 
This section advocates for defensive pessimism7 in the assessment of the legitimacy of 
meaning revisions, i.e., in the assessment of the value and desirability of a meaning 
revision to a certain end. Revisionary projects should be approached not just with defensive 
pessimism, but also with honest humility. Indeed, theorists should not only be aware that 
any possible meaning revision may, and likely will, have harmful unintended 
consequences. Theorists should also be aware of the cognitive biases that often prevent 
them from seeing the harm their plans and actions bring about. Insofar as it is possible, 
such harm should be minimized. Below, the debate about the amelioration of the concept 
of race is introduced as a case study that illustrates the difficulty of circumscribing the 
politically relevant revisions that, ultimately, do no harm. 
One way of deploying defensive pessimism, i.e., of taking proactive behavior to 
counteract possible negative outcomes, is to adopt “reflective equilibrium” as a method for 
finding coherence among diverse considered judgments, bringing them into relations of 
mutual support and explanation.8 The process should be understood as allowing for the 
revision of convictions, given the facts and the foreseeable outcomes, a revision that honest 
                                                   
6 See Snyder (2017a). 
7 The notion of defensive pessimism was introduced in Norem (2001). It is a cognitive strategy that helps 
people to take proactive behavior to counteract possible negative outcomes. 
8 After Rawls (1971). 
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humility can facilitate. But what are the morally or politically criteria that should guide our 
assessment of the facts and the foreseeable outcomes of concrete revisionary projects? 
In a 2018 lecture, Haslanger argued against ideal theory and in favor of critical non-
ideal theory to decide how to answer questions in social ontology – what possible and 
actual scenarios are relevant to consider. This decision, she argued, depends on what we 
want to know and for what purposes. Haslanger claimed that to address concrete justice 
issues, for instance “How should we revise the educational system in Boston to be more 
fair?”, it is not helpful to start from idealized examples and ideal theory: 
We can learn a lot about justice from considering concrete social circumstances. I would 
argue that such “bottom up” (v. top-down) theorizing is the best way to learn about justice, 
for our background presuppositions are tested against the messy reality we are trying to 
address. (Haslanger, 2018, 2) 
 
I don’t have a definite view here, but I am skeptical of doing away entirely with 
ideal theory, and relying only on “bottom up” theorizing. After all, without gaining 
distance from immediate practical concerns (interests and purposes) people may never 
move away from the deep feelings that something feels right, while willfully ignoring the 
harm that they can cause by acting only on such feelings.9 In the case of the rightness of a 
revision of meaning, the mere reliance on bottom up theorizing, and on feelings that 
something feels rights, can’t suffice to guarantee the moral or political legitimacy of a 
revisionary project. 
Perhaps ‘the value of a meaning revision’ can refer to its positive overall 
consequences, all things considered. The distinction between an amelioration and a 
perversion would then depend on the balance of the good versus the harmful consequences 
                                                   
9 In any case, following a reflective equilibrium approach can be pursued in a nonideal way. See for instance 
Stemplowska and Swift (2012). 
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of a revisionist project. But how can a theorist setting out to advance a new categorization 
know that good consequences will outweigh the harmful ones? 
The opening section distinguished between meaning revisions that are pursued to 
meet specific theoretical aims, and those that are intended to have real social consequences. 
This is a distinction that has been made in discussions about the usefulness of the concept 
of race. For instance, Kitcher (2007) defended a pragmatic biological view about race, 
considering that there are nondenumerably many ways to sort people into biological 
categories. These possible divisions, he claimed, depend on our cognitive capacities and 
our purposes. Other authors like Andreasen (2004) argued for a cladistic conception of 
human races (see also Andreasen 1998, 2000, 2005). One could perhaps ameliorate the 
concept of race to meet the purposes of a theory of human biology, and define races as 
“ancestor-descendant sequences of breeding populations that share a common origin.” 
(Andreasen, 2004, 425) 
Yet, eliminativists like Appiah (for instance in his contribution in Wilkins et al. 
1998) argued that there are no human races not just because ordinary racial categories do 
not track any actual natural differences between people. The harms caused by the false 
belief in a unique biological base for racial categories is an additional reason to abandon all 
talk of human races. In European Portuguese, for instance, the term ‘raça’ is conatively 
loaded. Most people on the left avoid using the word. In fact, the end of the fascist 
dictatorship in Portugal in the 1970s led also to the independence of former Portuguese 
colonies in Africa (the revolution to end the dictatorship was carried out by the military 
who wanted to put an end to the war for independence of those countries, which had been 
going on for approximately 13 years). In the new constituion drafted by a mostly socialist 
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and social-democratic parliament, all uses of ‘raça’ were removed. A similar process led to 
the removal of mentions of ‘Rasse’ from German legislation: 
Recent debates about Weissein (“whiteness”) in Germany provide further evidence that 
recognition of social realities of white supremacy does not presuppose an account of race in 
terms of these realities. For example, Amjahid’s (2017) book Unter Weissen (“Among 
Whites”) dissects German practices of white supremacy but explicitly avoids realist 
appeals to Rasse by pointing out the “historical burden” (2017, 49) of the concept. In this 
sense, the German concept of race may indeed be more adequately understood in analogy 
to other failed concepts such as witch. While alleged witches were forced in very real social 
positions, claims about the reality of races in Germany seem just as misleading as claims 
about the reality of witches. (Ludwig, 2018, 8) 
 
In reply to similar concerns, Kitcher says that the usefulness of racial categories 
will depend on the theoretical purposes that are best served by having those categories.10 
But, as he puts it, 
 
[E]ven if the concept of race plays a role in some lines of biological inquiry, the values of 
those lines of inquiry, and of pursuing them through retention of the concept of human 
race, would have to be sufficiently great to outweigh the potential damage caused by 
deploying this concept in the other contexts in which it plays so prominent a role, namely 
in our social discussions.” (Kitcher, 2007, 302) 
 
Kitcher’s suggestion – that we can ameliorate the concept of race when the value of 
pursuing biological lines of inquiry is sufficiently great to outweigh the potential damage 
caused by deploying the concept in social contexts – seems a bit cavalier. The theorist must 
assume that the value of his inquiry justifies not only categorizing people into clades, i.e., 
ancestor-descendant sequences of breeding populations, which of course is useful for 
biology. The theorist is, on assumption, also using the word ‘race’ to refer to a clade 
knowing that millions of people who have suffered because of their categorization under 
different “races”, and that talking of biological races will continue to feed the social 
discrimination perpetrated on this basis. Redefining the meaning of race terms for the 
                                                   
10 See also Díaz-León’s appeal to Kitcher’s criterion in this volume.  
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important goals of a theory does not do away, or minimize, the negative impact the use of 
‘race’ has in society.11 
What can we learn from this discussion? Can we say that the Germans and the 
Portuguese have ameliorated their race concepts by revising the terms used as empty, and 
hence removing them from legislation? That can’t be right. Learning that a term has no 
referent is not the same as revising its meaning. ‘Unicorn’ does not refer to anything 
because there are no unicorns, not because people ameliorated the meaning of the word to 
give it a null-extension. Pointing out that there are species of mammals that may have 
given origin to the concept of unicorn – horses and narvals –, and that the study of these 
organisms is useful in biology, does not entail in any way that biology would benefit from 
using the term ‘unicorn’ to refer to either species. Equally, ‘witch’ does not refer to 
anything because there are no witches. Pointing out that there have been women who were 
considered inconvenient and who may have been at the origin of the concept of witch – 
maybe those unmarried, maybe those with a mind of their own –, and that our knowledge 
of their lives is useful historical knowledge, and perhaps a useful sociological warning sign 
of misogyny, does not entail in any way that social theories would benefit from using the 
term ‘witch’ to refer to actual women. 
                                                   
11 I don’t address social constructionist non-eliminativism were, except briefly in a paragraph below. First, 
because race is not the main focus of this paper. It is enough here to focus on what most people take races to 
be – biological kinds (see Machery & Faucher, this volume, on the folk concept of race). Second, it’s not 
clear that the most appropriate way of addressing social inequality is on the basis of a social constructionist 
non-eliminativist notion of race. Races are not obviously social constructions, unlike property, presidents, 
judges, professors, stock exchanges, etc. The claim that race is socially constructed is a theoretical view that 
social theorists can adopt to explain both the fact that it is not biologically real and that there are social 
relations (in several countries) that seem to be based on racial or ethnic group membership. But the point of 
treating race as a social construction is not just theoretical, it is practical – the theorist offers the ameliorated 
concept to replace the folk concept. But how do we know that deploying the theoretical notion of race in the 
real world would contribute to fairness? For all we know, it may be that reifying social identities is an 
obstacle to the creation of a more equalitarian common ground., It may be that the social constructionist 
proposal faces the same challenges as the biological one: that redefining the meaning of race terms for the 
important goals of the theory does not erase the negative social impact of the use of ‘race’. 
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A meaning revision that gives an empty term a new extension can hardly be 
ameliorative when giving the term any extension raises the probability of causing very real 
harm. In the case of ‘race’, science can continue to research human reproduction and 
migration without using race-talk, as social sciences can without using ‘witch’. Race-talk 
has had, and continues to have, hugely harmful consequences. In the German or Portuguese 
contexts, the usefulness of pursuing lines of inquiry about human clades can be served with 
the technical term, ‘clades’, and not by the loaded terms ‘raça’ or ‘Rasse’. And as Ludwig 
(2018) suggests, issues related to justice can be addressed instead by talking of racialized 
practices and conceptions.12  
Now, even if it were true that there is only one way of classifying humans into 
different clades, it would still be the case that those divisions should not warrant racially 
based discrimination. For any biologically real characteristic, as for instance biological sex 
is, we should refrain from discriminating anyone on its basis. I take discrimination to differ 
from mere differential treatment.13 This is a different issue than the race problem discussed 
above. In the race case, there’s good reasons to deny that there are races, because the 
underlying biological reality does not provide a coherent way of matching biological 
categories to pre-theoretical folk race conceptions, and race words are normatively loaded 
in highly pernicious ways. But we do track other biological categories fairly well, as is the 
case with sex categories, or conditions like albinism. Female people, or albino people, have 
suffered discrimination and harm for being what they are. That harm does not justify doing 
away with categorizing sexually male and sexually female organisms, any more than the 
harm that albino organisms suffer (they are prime targets for predators, for a start) does not 
                                                   
12 This is also, in fact, the strategy that Robin Andreasen argues for in this volume, departing from her earlier 
views. 
13 See Lippert-Rasmussen (2013) for a discussion on ways to define discrimination. 
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justify doing away with the distinction between albinos and animals with (some) 
melatonin. Doing away with the categorization does not do away with the harm. When 
those organisms are human, recognizing people for what they are may indeed be the 
required differential treatment that is necessary to address the injuries they are more prone 
to suffer. For instance, recognizing the differences between female and male symptoms of 
cardiovascular disease is necessary for properly diagnosing and treating females under 40 
who may die from heart attacks or strokes (Stamp 2018). 
In recent work, Haslanger (2019) offers a more sophisticated answer to the question 
of how to assess the adequacy of ameliorative projects. She draws from work by Knobe et 
al. (2013) and Knobe and Prasada (2011) on dual character concepts, concepts that have 
both a descriptive and a normative dimension, where dual character concepts 
… are represented by (a) a set of concrete features and (b) a set of abstract values that the 
concrete features are seen as realizing. These two representations are intrinsically related, 
but they are nonetheless distinct, and they can sometimes yield opposing verdicts about 
whether a particular object counts as a category member or not. (Knobe and Prasada, 2011, 
2965) 
 
The dual character view offers a promising prospect for understanding the 
complexity of meaning change and will help with defining one of the senses of meaning 
perversions in the next section. 
This section showed that it’s unclear what the value of a meaning revision can be 
beyond serving theoretical purposes. The value of pursuing theoretical aims should be 
balanced against the possible harm caused by using the word in the wild. The conviction 
that an analysis is pursued to attain valuable theoretical or political aims does not guarantee 
the goodness of the outcome. On the contrary, theorists should be cautious of “deep 
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feelings” about the desirability of their projects and aims. The next section offers a way to 
circumscribe those meaning revisions that should not be pursued. It will take advantage of 
the notion of dual character concepts, and of the difference between harmful illocutionary 
effects and harmful perlocutionary effects. 
 
4 The legitimacy of ameliorative projects 
This section introduces some theoretical resources that, together with the notion of dual 
character concepts, can help us understand language’s motivational power, and the 
illocutionary and perlocutionary effects that contribute to structure social relations. These 
resources are drawn not only from philosophy of language, but also from philosophy of 
action and of emotions. It makes use of these resources to distinguish between two senses 
of meaning perversion. Some of the notions introduced play a crucial role in the 
explanation of the expressive normative dimensions of meaning. The notion of dual-
character concepts can be reinterpreted as multidimensional aspects of meaning, and that 
efforts to change one dimension of meaning may not be accompanied by changes in the 
other dimension. 
 
4.1 The illocutionary structure of contexts 
In recent joint work, García-Carpintero and I propose an expressive presuppositional 
account of derogatory language. Our view can be extended beyond derogatory language to 
other kinds of discourse that encode normative and evaluative expressive presuppositions. 
On our view, expressive presuppositions are not just propositions to be added to a common 
ground as shared beliefs. Expressive language, e.g. that involving slurs, includes a 
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cognitive and a conative dimension. Expressives make requirements on a shared conative 
record, governed by sui generis norms specific to affective attitudes and their public 
manifestations (Marques and García-Carpintero 2019).14 
If emotions are sui generis normative states (Mulligan 1998, D’Arms and Jacobson 
2000, Deonna and Teroni 2014), and the speech acts that express them are defined by 
distinctive norms, then in order to incorporate the presuppositional view of pejoratives we 
should add further illocutionary structure to the context set. The intentional objects of the 
emotional states provide this additional structure. For instance, a pejorative or a slur 
presents its target as an adequate recipient of mistreatment., as worthy of contempt. The 
“formal object” of the emotion is the normative condition that allegedly justifies the 
emotional attitude towards it. But this normative condition – the property of being 
contemptible – is not part of the represented content, and hence what speakers accept in 
accepting a use of a pejorative is not the belief that a target is worthy of contempt. 
The nature of the expressive conative dimension of language use requires 
conversational contexts to have illocutionary structure,15 including the different classes of 
contents to which speakers are committed in different modes: in the ways they are 
committed to their beliefs, to their intentions, to their affective attitudes, and to the 
questions guiding their inquiries. In felicitous contexts, these different commitments are 
mutually shared, and license presuppositions. As Stalnaker’s (1978) account of assertion 
emphasizes, an accepted assertion comes to be presupposed afterwards, allowing for the 
satisfaction of presuppositional requirements later on in the discourse. Similarly, accepted 
                                                   
14 See also Cepollaro & Stojanovic (2016) for a related hybrid presuppositional view. 
15 Charlow (2016) and Portner (2016) suggest that directives have a content to be added (when successful) to 
a collection of propositions that represent the mutually known active projects of the interlocutors, a “To Do 
List” or “Plan Set”, and Roberts (2012) argues that contexts are further structured by the questions under 
discussion. 
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questions under discussion (QUDs), directives, and expressives can come to be taken for 
granted, constraining the legitimate moves that can later be made. 
Our account fills in some of the details of the proposal made by Langton (2012): 
I want to propose, in an exploratory spirit, the idea that the phenomenon of accommodation 
might extend beyond belief—beyond conversational score, and common ground, as 
originally conceived—to include accommodation of other attitudes, including desire and 
hatred. My remarks here will inevitably be programmatic. But to convey the general idea: 
just as a hearer’s belief can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes that belief, so 
too a hearer’s desire can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes the hearer’s 
desire; and so too a hearer’s hatred can spring into being, after the speaker presupposes that 
hatred. Stalnaker’s common ground can perhaps be extended to include not just common 
beliefs, and other belief-like attitudes, but common desires, and common feelings, as well. 
Speakers invite hearers not only to join in a shared belief world, but also a shared desire 
world, and a shared hate world. (Langton, 2012, 140) 
 
The context update made with the literal use of an expressive is an update not only 
on the shared cognitive common ground – the set of propositions that come to be 
commonly accepted under a belief mode –, but also on shared “motivational set”16 – the set 
of intentions, evaluative dispositions, or desires that are shared under intentional and 
sentimental modes. 
A shared motivational set can be part of common ground, which would include 
those motivational attitudes that are in fact common, and taken to be such. But we can also 
represent a ‘motivational score’ as part of a conversational score, i.e. those attitudes whose 
permissible expression is part of the conversational score. The distinction is useful. People 
often accept to follow norms that they don’t agree with or that they disavow, and accept to 
act in accordance with widely shared and permissible evaluative attitudes that they do not 
actually have. 
                                                   
16 The suggestion adapts Bernard Williams (1979)’s notion of a ‘motivational set’ the set of dispositional 
attitudes, plans, intentions, emotions, etc., that identify the reasons agents have for acting, and are an integral 
part of their practical reasoning. 
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People may have doubts about the prospects of sharing emotions under a 
sentimental mode, even if the prospect of sharing plans does not raise the same doubts.17 
But authors like Salmela and Michiru (2016) have outlined an account of collective 
emotions that links the intentional structure of joint actions and the underlying cognitive 
and affective mechanisms. Collective emotions, they argue, can function as both 
motivating and justifying reasons for jointly intentional actions, in some cases even 
without prior joint intentions of the participants.18 
Before embarking on meaning or conceptual revision projects, theorists should not 
only incorporate the developments on dual character concepts, as Haslanger proposes. 
They should also consider the hybrid nature of evaluative and normative language, and 
seek a better understanding of the role of emotions in motivating and persuading through 
discourse. If words’ meanings can serve to make not only assertive illocutionary acts, but 
also to make expressive speech acts, the things (situations, events, or people) described can 
be taken for granted as realizing certain norms or values through the emotional or affective 
attitudes expressed. The next subsection shows how harmful revisionary projects will often 
result from this hybrid dimension of language. 
 
4.2 Harmful perlocutionary effects or constitutive norm erosions? 
The main question this paper addresses is how can we assess the legitimacy of ameliorative 
purposes and projects. The literature on conceptual engineering has not devoted sufficient 
attention to the possibility of meaning perversions. However, conceptual or meaning 
                                                   
17 On shared plans, see for instance Kutz (2000). 
18 Salmela and von Scheve (2017) deploy research on collective emotions to explain right-wing radical 
populism, illustrating the usefulness of a notion of a common motivational set to explain the functioning of 
Dangerous Speech. They argue that there are two psychological mechanisms underlying the rise of right-
wing populism: ressentiment and emotional distancing. 
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revisions can be either ameliorative or perversive. Ameliorations are improvements on 
existing meanings. Perversions, in contrast and by analogy, are corruptions of existing 
meanings. 
This is still fairly imprecise, but it can be understood in two ways. First, perversions 
can be understood in causal effects. These could include many of the effects that 
Klemperer and Gessen mention: an impoverished experience, a destitute language, the loss 
of a shared reality, the loss of individual autonomy to a language that ‘thinks for us, and 
dictates our feelings”’, as well as actual discrimination or oppression. The political dangers 
of these effects should not be neglected or minimized. These are often the effects autocrats 
intend, since they diminish a population’s capacity to resist the autocrat’s control over 
social and political reality: 
Causal meaning perversions are attempts to hijack language (e.g. of justice, 
politics, social roles, or moral or epistemic virtues) in a way that makes people 
worse off. In other words, meaning perversions are revisionary or engineering 
projects that cause harm. 
 
In a very literal sense, if a meaning revision produces harmful consequences it is 
not an amelioration. We may be concerned, however, that the causal notion of perversion 
cannot guide us in distinguishing between the merely feasible projects (in Podosky’s sense, 
introduced at the start of this chapter) and the morally legitimate projects.  
We need a more perspicuous way of distinguishing ameliorations from perversions, 
one that goes beyond a focus on possible harmful effects. The reason is, fundamentally, 
epistemic. Shelly Kagan spells it out: 
Perhaps the most common objection to consequentialism is this: it is impossible to know 
the future. This means that you will never be absolutely certain as to what all the 
consequences of your act will be. An act that looks like it will lead to the best results 
overall may turn out badly, since things often don’t turn out the way you think they will. 
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Something extremely unlikely may happen, and an act that was overwhelmingly likely to 
lead to good results might – for reasons beyond your control – produce disaster. Or there 
may be long term bad effects from your act, side effects that were unforeseen and indeed 
unforeseeable. In fact lacking a crystal ball, how could you possibly tell what all the effects 
of your act will be? So how can we tell which act will lead to the best results overall – 
counting all the results? This seems to mean that consequentialism will be unusable as a 
moral guide to action. (Kagan, 1998, 64) 
 
Kagan’s argument raises a problem for conceptual engineering projects generally.19 
It is a problem for efforts to discriminate ameliorations from perversions, and presses us to 
find a more useful way of identifying the engineering concepts we should be engaged in, 
morally and politically. 
A second sense of meaning perversions, I suggest, is constitutive. The cases that 
Klemperer and Gessen focus on, together with the theoretical resources introduced in the 
previous subsection, and a modification of Jason Stanley’s definition of undermining 
propaganda (Stanley 2015) provide the elements for a different better definition. 
Stanley defines undermining propaganda thus: 
Undermining Propaganda: A contribution to public discourse that is presented as an 
embodiment of certain ideals yet is of a kind that tends to erode those very ideals. (Stanley, 
2015, 52-3). 
 
Now, I don’t use Stanley’s definition of undermining propaganda for two reasons. 
First, propaganda as he defines it will include uses of code words or dogwhistles 
(Mendelberg 2001, Khoo 2017, Saul 2018), or of racial figleaves (Saul 2017), and I think 
that meaning perversions function in different ways than these other phenomena. Second, I 
think that meaning perversions can occur outside the remit of propaganda, for instance, in a 
relationship, where one of the parties can pervert the meaning of ‘good friend’. Hence, not 
                                                   
19 This argument is made more precise in Lenman (2000). 
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all propaganda is a meaning perversion, and not all meaning perversions are propaganda. 
In my proposed definition, the idea of an undermining of norms and ideals is still 
essential. Normally, a correct use of word that expressively presupposes a norm or a value 
reinforces that value or norm, which is taken for granted as common ground. For instance, 
thanking a child for being polite helps to reinforce polite interactions and rules of etiquette. 
Meaning perversions are uses of words that also presuppose shared norms or values, but 
pervert the norm enforcement process because they involve the application of terms or 
phrases to things that don’t realize the presupposed values: 
Constitutive meaning perversions A speaker S perverts the meaning of a word w 
just in case S’s use of w is presented as an enforcement or application of norms or 
values that w expressively presupposes, which erodes those very same norms or 
values by being misapplied to an unsuitable referent. 
 
A use of a word is a perversion when it is false that the word applies to what the 
speaker intends to refer to, and the use of the word nonetheless has the illocutionary 
expressive effect it constitutively has – it expresses a conative state to the effect that what 
the speaker is referring to realizes a certain value or norm.  
Anyone who accepts the utterance making this expressive presupposition will take 
for granted that what is referred realizes that value. In other words, she will take for 
granted the permissibility of the relevant evaluative attitudes, and will possibly also share 
them. Those attitudes are often themselves motivating and justifying reasons for jointly 
intentional action. The use is perversive in that what is referred does not actually realize the 
presupposed value. And hence the motivated actions are not the appropriate actions to take 
towards the presumed referent.  
What goes on with meaning perversions, like Putin’s ‘the dictatorship of the rule of 
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law’, the Nazi ‘fanatic hero’, Medvedev’s ‘managed democracy’, Soviet elections as ‘free 
expressions of citizen will’, is that they take advantage of the hybrid contents these phrases 
encode. There are, on the one hand, legitimate referents of words like ‘democracy’, ‘free’, 
‘elections’. The referents would be picked by the set of concrete features that correspond to 
the first dimension of dual-character concepts. But there are, on the other hand, the 
expressive normative or evaluative presupposition that these phrases express. This would 
correspond to the set of abstract values those concrete features would realize.  
Thus, a sincere literal use of ‘democracy’ made by a competent speaker denotes any 
form of political organization or government that displays some minimal features (allowing 
for more and less fitting cases – from full to flawed democracies). To accept that a state is 
democratic licenses certain presuppositions, not just about features of its form of 
government, but also about how it realizes certain desirable normative values. To take for 
granted that a form of government is democratic is to take for granted that it is desirable as 
good. Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said for ‘freedom’ or ‘elections’. 
Besides these illocutionary effects, there are additional probable harmful 
perlocutionary effects of the use of the word w. The constitutive sense of meaning 
perversions and their perlocutionary effects are related. One sense in which we can 
pinpoint the nature of meaning perversions is that they have the harmful perlocutionary 
effects they have precisely because they contribute to undermine the presupposed norms or 
values. But the two senses are not equivalent and may not be co-extensional. Some 
revisions that have harmful consequences will not be constitutively perversive. 
Take ‘free elections’: Free elections are good things, they are essential for 
democracies, a recognition of the citizens’ sovereignty through their representation in the 
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institutions of their countries. The expression has a positive expressive connotation. That 
positive aspect of the meaning of ‘free election’ can be taken for granted, at least for a 
good amount of time, to manipulate people. By describing the ritual practice of the so-
called elections in the Soviet Union the Soviet regime was perverting the meaning of ‘free 
elections’. The ritual that was called a ‘free election’ did not display any of the concrete 
features that democracies must minimally exemplify. And hence, that ritual did not actually 
realize the positive normative value of free elections. 
The normative presupposition expressed by ‘free election’, which is taken for 
granted as part of the motivational conversational set, pragmatically contradicts the actual 
application of the phrase to something that does not meet the minimal constraints for being 
a free election. By doing this, the Soviet regime was eroding the positive value of ‘free 
election’, while normalizing the new undemocratic practice. People lived under a 
pragmatic contradiction between the official normative ideal – democracies are valuable 
and participating in them is desirable –, and the reality they were forced to inhabit. And 
people who are deprived of the means to appropriately describe the situation they live in 
are people that are deprived of the means to appropriately address it, and are more easily 
controlled by authoritarian regimes, as both Klemperer and Gessen testify. These are some 
of the harmful perlocutionary effects of meaning perversions.  
Meaning perversions contrast with code words. Code words induce the acceptance 
into the motivational common ground of evaluative dispositions, plans, and norms, that 
conflict with pre-accepted dispositions/plans/norms that are part of a shared conversational 
score. But the expression of those values or norms is not encoded (not even as a 
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presupposition) in the meaning of a code word.20 This is exemplified in uses of code words 
lacking a negative racial connotation, for instance “we are doing a census of the people 
living in the inner-city to determine the investment in new and much-needed pre-schools 
and centers for primary medical attention”. Moreover, even those uses that do implicate a 
racial connotation denote their proper referent in the world, e.g. ‘inner-city’ refers to actual 
urban areas. That’s why plausible deniability is possible – one can always point out that 
what one said is factually true, and since the racial connotation is not part of encoded 
meaning, there is no contradiction in that denial. 
In contrast, the normative and evaluative connotation of a meaning perversion is 
encoded in the word’s meaning, and thus it is automatically taken for granted as part of the 
conversational record. Hence, speech that perverts meaning is easily accepted in a context, 
since it aligns with what is already accepted as part of the shared motivational set. This 
explains Klemperer (2000)’s description: “as soon as this concept (heroism) was touched 
upon, everything became blurred in the fog of Nazism”. However, meaning perversions are 
not used to denote their proper referents in the world. As a result, the evaluative 
connotation conflicts with the use the word to talk about an improper referent that doesn’t 
fit the value it is presented as realizing. 
As a result of these differences, the argumentative strategies of speakers who use 
code words and those who use meaning perversions differ. Code words allow plausible 
deniability: “I wasn’t saying anything about race! I was talking about criminality in certain 
urban areas”. Meaning perversions, in contrast, allow for rhetorical norm-enforcement 
questions: “How can you be against our freedom?”, “How can you oppose democracy?”, 
                                                   
20 For discussion, see Khoo (2017). 
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“How can you believe what an enemy of the people says?” Interlocutors are, naturally, 
expected to reject that they are against freedom, or that they oppose democracy, or that 
they believe their enemies. They are also now pressed to accept that an improper referent 
has the concrete features that realize the values that they are already take for granted. 
It may be hard to know in advance if a given revision will have harmful effects, 
although we can try to fend them off for instance by combining, as I suggested, reflective 
equilibrium methods guided by defensive pessimism and honest humility. This means 
essentially that we should expect bad consequences to occur (and try to foresee them to the 
best of our ability) and be prepared to revise our expectations and plans if necessary. But it 
is not hard to know in advance if a given revision is harmful if it is a meaning revision in 
the second, constitutive, sense. We can know, by understanding the mechanisms at play, 
that referring to an improper referent and accepting that it fits the values or norms it very 
plainly cannot fit. 
When a revision is a perversion in the constitutive sense, it is especially hard to 
resist. It is hard to give a reply to propagandistic calls for respecting the will of the people, 
or for holding free elections, or for taking back control. Yet, in the mouth of many 
demagogues, these are meaning perversions: uses of ‘the people’ that exclude most of the 
people, of ‘free elections’ that are neither free nor an exercise in autonomous individual 
choice, of ‘take back control’ that give away control. 
How do we resist meaning perversions, or spot them? Any direct criticism invites 
replies like “how can you be against my freedom?”, or “how can you be against the 
people?” An interlocutor is left speechless, since in normal circumstances a normal reply 
would be obviously “no! I’m not against the people, and I’m not against free elections”. 
30  
Those rhetorical questions are effective to advance a meaning perversion because they 
seem to reinforce shared norms, while eroding them. Theorists who are interested in 
advancing a revisionist project can easily be unaware that they we are putting forward a 
perversion instead of an amelioration. If, as Maynard and Benesch (2016) put it, people are 
often moved by “deep and unreflected feelings that something feels ‘good’ or ‘bad”’ which 
induce “positive moral self-appraisal”, theorists may resist taking the extra step required to 
disentangle their conviction in the intended good results and the appraisal that the 
misapplication will erode the very same values or normative principles we believe we are 
promoting. 21 
This is a small step forward in delimitating the scope of the answer to the question 
how can we assess the legitimacy of ameliorative projects. We can complement the 
discussion about why it is problematic to engineer race-talk, for instance. Recall that race-
talk has had, and continues to have, hugely harmful consequences. Ordinary race concepts 
are presumed to track a set of concrete biological features that identify a natural class, 
which turns out to be empty. The values that are supposed to be realized by those concrete 
features present people as less, or more, deserving of consideration, social standing, or 
respect as persons by being presumed to exhibit certain biological features. We can try to 
ameliorate what ‘race’ refers – for instance, to argue that that it refers to ancestor-
descendant sequences of breeding populations that share a common origin. But the 
normative presuppositions that come with race-talk are not amenable to amelioration by 
fiat, particularly when there have been billions killed or enslaved on account of the 
negative values they were presumed to realize. The decision to do away with talk of Rasse 
                                                   
21 Bicchieri (2005, 2017) work models how shared social norms that are followed in a society rely on 
people’s normative and empirical expectations with respect to what others will do and feel, and the 
conditions under which normative change occurs. 
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or raça acknowledge this heavy burden. Moreover, there are alternative ways to address 
resilient racism, and to pursue useful lines of inquiry in biology, anthropology, or 
sociology. 
 
5 Closing remarks 
I have argued for the importance of adding the question How can we assess the legitimacy 
of ameliorative projects? to the list of questions that conceptual engineering and 
conceptual ethics seek to address. I have also argued that our focus on the normative 
constraints of conceptual engineering should emphasize the moral and political legitimacy 
of the projects pursued. I was guided, in this regard, by troubling historical lessons. By 
trying to characterize meaning perversions, I hope to have offered a way of demarcating 
what a legitimate conceptual amelioration cannot be. The two senses of meaning 
perversion offered demarcate the set of morally permissible meaning or conceptual 
engineering projects. Revisionary projects that are permissible are the set of meaning 
revisions that are not perversions. That means that they are meaning revisions that (a) don’t 
have harmful consequences, and that (b) do not misapply a word to something unfitting the 
values presupposed by the use of the word. 
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